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faith"14 and absence of "notice"'15 to convey a single concept
of bona fides. Although this merging of two subsections of
the N.I.L. has not led to erroneous decisions, it is believed
that analysis of cases is facilitated by considering the com-
ponent parts of the concept. "Notice"'16 is merely a more
detailed statement of one part of the larger abstract idea of
good faith." It concerns the knowledge of facts'8 which ex-
isted prior to the immediate transaction between the holder
and his transferor. Attention is directed to the fact that
notice of a defect in title, as this terminology is used in sec.
52-4 N.I.L., is limited to defects in the title of the person
who negotiated the paper to the holder. Indeed, knowledge
of a defect in a previous holder's title will not prevent a per-
son from being a holder in due course unless there is an ab-
sence of good faith. Thus, when there is an infirmity in the
instrument, or when the holder's transferor possessed a de-
fective title, notice is the paramount consideration; all other
situations raise the question of compliance with requirements
of good faith.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CIVIL SERVANTS AND THE RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN POLITICAL
ACTIVITY
Employees in the classified civil service of the United
States have for many years been prohibited from engaging
14. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §19-402 (3).
15. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §19-402 (4).
16. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §19-406. There may be actual or
constructive notice; the latter is a legal inference from established
facts. When an alleged defect appears on the face of the instru-
ment and is a mere matter of inspection, the question becomes one
of law for the court. Norton, "Bills and Notes" (4th ed. 1914)
438. Bigelow seems to adopt the doctrine of actual (or subjective
test) bad faith but later qualifies this when notice is proved or
presumed from disclosures on the instrument. In such cases the
statute has not abolished the rule that notice maybe established
by circumstantial evidence. Bigelow, "Bills, Notes and Checks"
(3rd ed. 1928) §473-476.
17. See notes 12 and 13 supra.
18. 1. The title of the holder's transferor was defective; 2, an
infirmity existed in the instrument; or 3. facts so strongly in-
dicated the existence of 1 or 2 that taking the instrument would
amount to bad faith. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §19-406.
19. "That at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of
any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person
negotiating it." Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §19-402 (4).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
in certain political activities., In 1939 the Hatch Act brought
substantially all employees in the executive branch of the fed-
eral government within the purview of similar prohibitions.2
Dismissal is the penalty prescribed for federal employees en-
gaging in the prohibited activies.3  State employees Whose
principal employment is in connection with an activity which
is financed in whole or in part from federal funds, were made
subject to these prohibitions in 1940.4  If the Civil Service
Commission finds that a state employee has violated the pro-
hibitions against political activity, the state is notified. If
it does not choose to dismiss the employee, a sum equal to
two years' salary for that employee is withheld from the grant
to the state.5
The State of Oklahoma and the United Public Works of
America (C.I.O.) in separate actions'recently challenged the
constitutionality of this legislation. In Oklahoma v. United
States Civil Service Commission,6 a member of the State High-
1. (Civil Service Act of 1883), 22 Stat. 403-04 (1883), 5 U.S.C.A.
§633 (1927).
2. 53 Stat. 1147 (1939), as amended, 18 U.S.C.A.§611 (Supp. 1946)
hereinafter referred to as the Hatch Act) important policy making
officials who change with administrations and dollar a year men
are excepted. The specific sentence under fire makes it unlawful for
any person employed in the executive branch of the Federal Gov-
rnment with the exceptions before noted, "to take any active part
in political management or in political campaigns."
3. Actually the Civil Service Commission's inquiry is limited to those
employees in the classified civil service. Other employees are sub-ject to removal by their department heads for violation of the
regulations. Actual discharge in all cases is made by the de-
partment head concerned, but where the Commission has jurisdic-
tion it can notify the Comptroller to withhold any further com-
pensation from an employee it has determined to be guilty. Dis-
missal is mandatory if a violation is found by a federal employee;
the Commission has discretion to leave a state employee in office
if his transgression does not in its opinion justify removal. 40
Op. Atty. Gen. No. 2.
4. Section 12(a) of the Hatch Act applies to employees of any state
or local agency financed "in whole or part by federal funds." They
are forbidden "to take any active part in political management
or in political campaigns."
5. Section 12 of the Hatch Act provides for this penalty unless the
employee is dismissed from all state activity, federally financed or
not. This would appear to be a violation of the Tenth Amend-
ment. However, since Oklahoma kept the'employee on his same
position the question did not arise. See n. 6 infra.
6. 67 S.Ct. 544 (1947). There was doubt in this case as to whether
a justiciable controversy was presented. The court distinguished
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447,480 (1923) on its facts. The
distinction is tenuous. The "Maternity Act" in the Mellon case
authorized appropriations to be made among states accepting its
1947]
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way Commission, which administered a program financed in
part with federal funds, served simultaneously as Chairman
of the Democratic Party's State Central Committee. The
United States Civil Service Commission held the required
hearing and notified the State that there had been a violation
of the Hatch Act warranting dismissal of the Highway Com-
missioner. After thirty days, no action having been taken
by the State to dismiss the employee, the Civil Service Com-
mission certified an order to the appropriate federal agency
requiring it to withhold two years' salary from further grants
to Oklahoma7
Oklahoma contended that the enforcement provisions in
the Hatch Act invaded the powers reserved to the states. The
Hatch Act, however, is carefully worded so that no order is
given to the state. If it decides to resist the suggestion of
removal, that is the state's privilege, but federal funds are
no longer forthcoming to pay the salary of the employee.,
The Tenth Amendment in nowise restricts the use of powers
granted to the federal government nor means appropriate to
their implementation. The power of the federal government
to fix the terms and conditions upon which grants to the
states shall depend is firmly established.1o The decision on
this point is clearly in accord with past cases.
provisions, the purpose being to reduce infant mortality. There
was to be joint federal and state expenditure with the former
having the power to withhold funds if it decided they were not
being properly expended. The Supreme Court held there was no
invasion of state sovereignty, no required submission. Only an
abstract question of political power, the power of Congress to
pass such a statute existed, and that was not thought to be a mat-
ter for court decision.
7. 53 Stat. 1147 (1939), as amended, 18 U.S.C.A. §611 (Supp. 1946).
8. The following cases illustrate application of the statute in this
respect: Ohio v. United States Civil Service Commission,
65 F. Supp. 776,780,781 (1946), is factually about the same as
the following case. Stewart v. United States Civil Service Com-
mission, 45 F. Supp. 697,701 (1942), plaintiff was Director of
Georgia State Bureau of Unemployment Compensation and while
in that position solicited campaign funds from employees. Neu-
stein v. Mitchell, 52 F. Supp. 531 (1943), plaintiff, a member of
the New York Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board was re-
moved for actively participating in a political campaign.
9. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Ashwander v. Ten-
nessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288,338 (1935); McCullough v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316,405 (U.S. 1819). If Federal and state pow-
ers conflict, the latter must yield, Oklahoma v. Atkinson Co., 313
U.S. 508 (1941).
10. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548,578,595 (1936);
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1,73 (1935); Cf. Massachusetts
v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447,482 (1923).
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The challenge to the Act by a group of federal employees
presented in United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell"
involved more serious considerations. In an injunction and
declaratory judgment proceeding, the plaintiffs claimed that
the provisions of the Hatch Act in question violated their
constitutional rights to free speech and to engage in political
activity.
In the case of Ex Parte Curtis,'12 decided in 1882, the
Court permitted a reasonable regulation of civil servants in
the interests of efficiency and good government. The stat-
ute attacked in that case forbade money contributions by
government employees solicited by or made to other officials
or employees for political purposes, but did not restrict
any other type of contribution. The opinion of the court by
Chief Justice Waite emphasized the authority of Congress
to pass laws necessary for the proper exercize of delegated
powers. He also observed that contributions made under
the proscribed conditions were in all likelihood not given
to exercise a political privilege, but to escape the displeasure
of superiors. The statement was also made, and it seems as
pertinent today as then, that " . . . when public employ-
ment depends to any considerable extent upon party success,
those in office will naturally be desirous of keeping the party
to which they belong in power."' 3 The majority in Ex parte
Curtis were necessarily aware of the full implications of
their decision for the forceful dissent of Justice Bradley
anticipated most of the civil rights objections to the type of
legislation under discussion.' 4
Contrasting with the reasonable regulation doctrine of
the Curtis case, stand the galaxy of civil rights cases which
have in late years given the guarantees of the Bill of Rights
new stature and increased meaning.15 In the now famous
11. 67 S.Ct. 556 (1947).
12. 106 U.S. 371 (1882).
13. Today dismissal must be for cause but nevertheless, many subtle
ways exist in which superiors could advance the politically par-
tisan for their efforts if the Hatch Act did not outlaw such action.
In this sense the Act is felt to be a safeguard against the con-
ceivable development of a one party system.
14. 106 U.S. 371 (1882).
15. E.g. West Virginia Bd. of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Schneider
v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 44
(1938); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
1947]
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footnote four to United States v. Carolene Products Co.,'8
the late Chief Justice pointed out that the presumption oper-
ating in favor of the constitutionality of legislation would be
narrower in scope when an area covered by a specific prohibi-
tion of the Constitution, particularly the first ten command-
ments, was invaded. The present Court's policy to strike down
legislation restricting civil rights in the absence of a "clear
and present danger" is firmly established.'7  The Public
Worker's Case, then, posed conflicting policies, one the
reasonable regulation of the civil service by Congress, the
other the high respect due civil rights. The majority does not
feel that the requisite protection of civil rights has overrid-
den the reasonable regulation permitted to Congress.
The Court in the United Public Worker's case asserts that
the act is directed at active participation in political man-
agement and political campaigns by government employees.
Money contributions are prohibited only when solicited from
or made to another employee, so here the contributions of
energy prohibited are those to partisan activity. The basic
rights to vote and to express opinions outside the actual arena
of party strife remain inviolate. The Court seems to assume
that the clear and present danger doctrine does not apply
to legislation promulgated for the regulation of government
employees. Here, perhaps the famous "if reasonable men
can differ" doctrine, consistently advanced by Holmes in
fields other than civil rights"8 is the proper criterion. Indeed,
the Court points out that if the "reasonableness" test is not
adopted, Congress would be powerless at this time to cope
with threatened evils, particularly one-party perpetuation,
regarded by many persons as a material threat to our demo-
cratic system of government.
Once it is 'conceded that the reasonableness test is ap-
plicable to this legislation, the dissent of Justice Douglas,9
16. 304 U.S. 144,152 (1937).
17. Rosenfeld and Tannen, "Civil Liberties Under the Roosevelt Ad-
ministration," 5 Law G. Rev. 182 (1945); Louis Luskey, "Minority
Rights and Public Interest," 52 Yale L. J. 1 (1942).
18. In fields other than those involving civil liberties, Holmes refused
to strike down legislation on the reasons or policy of which reason-
able men differ. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161,191 (1907);
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,76 (1905). This view has now
been accepted by the Court, Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502,
537-39 (1933).
19. 67 S.Ct. 577 (1947). . .
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which is based on the "clear and present danger" test, loses
its force. 'The mere fact that the method of regulation chosen
might be greatly improved would not in itself justify the
court in striking it down. A roller in a federal mint has
little contact with the public, but reasonable men might con-
clude that political activity on his part would bring him pre-
ferment. Injury to the efficiency of the government is easy
to conjecture under such circumstances.
Justice Black, in his dissent,20 contended that the pro-
vision attacked is too broad, ambiguous and uncertain in its
consequences. However, he seems to overlook the long his-
tory of such regulation' 1 and its application in the companion
field of military personnel.22  No one denies that the prin-
ciple of regulation can go too far but Justice Holmes has
pointed out that questions of degree are inescapable23 and
not in themselves grounds for alarm. Justice Bradley in
188224 foresaw the direst consequences following in the wake
of the regulation there advanced. They have yet to material-
ize.
Strenuous objection to the Act is made by posing hypo-
thetical cases of injustice. In answering a similar argment
in United States v. Wurzcak, 25 a case involving a statute
of the type under discussion, the opinion of Justice Holmes
said the question of uncertainty could wait until a case of
doubt arose. Much of the alleged vagueness of the rules is
imaginary. The Civil Service Commission has conspicuously
posted notice of specific unallowable practices.2 6 Anyone de-
20. 67 S.Ct. 572 (1947).
21. "The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics
but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." McAuliffe
v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216,220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
22. Army Regulations No. 600-10,1 p. 5 provide substantially the same
restriction on military personnel as Sec. 9(a) of the Hatch Act.
applies to Federal employees.
23. See dissenting opinion, Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562,631
(1906). "I am the last man in the world to quarrel with a distinc-
tion simply because it is one of degree. Most distinctions, in my
opinion, are of that sort, and are none the worse for it. But the
line which is drawn must be justified by the fact that it is a
little nearer than the nearest opposing case to one pole of an
admitted antithesis."
25. 280 U.S. 396 (1930).
26. E.g. United States Civil Service Commission, Political Activity
and Political Assessments, Form 1236, September 1939.
1947]
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siring to comply with the law can read and obey the instruc-
tions on these posters. None of. the employees involved in
these cases appeared ignorant of the regulations.
Nevertheless the Act could be more explicit.2 7 The faults
are difficult to remedy because the Act defines active par-
ticipation in politics as the same activities that the Civil
Service Commission had determined to be prohibited when the
act took effect in 1940. A new law might well accumulate
the experiences of the last seven years into three or four
basic regulations which would obviate most of the present
uncertainty and doubt.
Many of the English speaking countries have adopted
this type of regulation, 28 an indication perhaps that the prob-
lem is inescapable in a democratic form of government. The
gigantic size of modern civil services and their infinitude of
vital contacts with all phases of national life call for serious
consideration of the subject and an orientation -of our po-
litical philosophies in terms of necessities. The decisions
discussed appear to reconcile individual freedom with the
political facts of life produced by the large scale government
of our time.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
INDIANA GROSS INCOME TAX AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
The Indiana Gross Income Tax Division has set forth
the following 'prerequisites' to tax exemption under the Com-
merce Clause; (1) Income derived from transactions with
customers who are non-residents of Indiana, and that (2)
by reason of the receipt of a prior order, (3) delivery was
required and made, and that (4) such delivery across states
lines was necessary and essential to the consummation of the
transaction. Ind. Gross Income Tax Div., Departmental mem-
orandum, January 24, 1947.
This ruling was issued as a result of the recent Supreme
Court decision in Freeman v. Hewit,' which held the Ind.
27. E.g. section 15 of the Hatch Act enacts into law all the previous
rulings of the Commission which are thus not subject to broad
changes.
28. Leonard D. White, "Civil Service in the Modern State" (1930).
1. 67 S. Ct. 274 (1946). Rutledge, J., concurring at 280; Douglas
and Murphy, J.J., dissenting at 292; Black, J., dissenting without
opinion. The rationale of the majority opinion by Mr. Justice
[Vol. 22
